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BANKING SUPERVISION AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY:
CAPITAL STANDARDS REGULATION*
James V. Houpt**
It is a pleasure to be here to discuss some of the issues I
believe are important regarding risk management practices in
banking today. We seem to hear constantly about the rapid pace
of innovation in all aspects of business and finance, about
globalization of financial markets brought on by improved
technologies and increased international trade, and about all the
changes these trends have caused in banking and bank
supervisory practices.
I would like to review some of the steps bank supervisors
have taken to adapt to changing times and to offer some thoughts
about where we could be heading. In particular, I want to focus
on the recent performance of market risk models and on issues
surrounding regulatory capital standards for credit risk.
WHAT A YEAR!
In terms of financial markets and bank supervision, last year
was a doozy. We began the year by implementing the Market
Risk Amendment to the Basle Capital Accord,' which has served
as the international capital standard for banks over the past
* This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28,1999.
** Deputy Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Mr. Houpt's
remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve System
or any of its Divisions.
1. Ar ENDmENT To nH CAPITAL ACCORD TO INcORpOrATE MARKET RISKS
(Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision 1996) [hereinafter MARKET RiSK
AiENDMENT], amending INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPrrAL STANDARDS (Basle Comm. on Banking
Supervision 1988) [hereinafter BASLE CAPrrAL ACCORD]. The MARKET RISK
AMENDMENT and the BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD may be obtained at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>.
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decade.2 The amendment permitted banks to use internal models
for calculating regulatory capital requirements for their trading
activities. Outside the United States, regulators permitted banks
to use either their internal models or a standardized supervisory
measure to calculate their market risk capital requirements. In
this country, there was no alternative to models because we
believed the supervisory measure was simply too crude, artificial,
burdensome, and incorrect. It also failed to provide the risk
management incentives that we believe are necessary.
Last year also saw historically high levels of market volatility,
leading to the near collapse last fall of the large, highly regarded
hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management ("LTCM").3 All in
2. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,064
(1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3,208,225 & 325 as amended by 64 Fed.
Reg. 19,034 (1999)) (implementing the Market Risk Amendment jointly by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation).
3. On September 23, 1998, with the encouragement of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, fifteen major banks injected $3.625 billion into
Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. [hereinafter LTCM], a private
investment fund engaged in highly leveraged securities transactions based on
advanced mathematical models, to prevent its collapse and potential default
on an estimated $125 billion it had borrowed on $2.2 billion in capital. See
Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters, so
the Fed Persuades Big Banks to Ante Up; Firms to Lend $3.6 Billion as Long-
Term Capital Loses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1998 at Al
(reporting on an "extraordinary gathering" in which the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York persuaded large banks to invest over $3.5 billion in LTCM
in return for a 90% ownership stake, and to prevent a financial crisis should it
unwind its positions); Steven Mufson, What Went Wrong? Fund's Big Bettors
Learned that Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. POST, Sep. 27, 1998, at HI
(corrected Sep. 29, 1998) (listing fourteen major banks and institutions which
invested a total of $3.6 billion); Steven Syre, Fleet, BankBoston in Syndicate
Backing Troubled Hedge Fund, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 26, 1998, at F1 (reporting
that Fleet Financial Group had loaned $25 million to LTCM as part of the
bail-out); Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund's Bets Now
Estimated at $1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TImEs, Sep. 26, 1998, at Al (citing financiers'
estimates that LTCM had leveraged borrowings of $125 billion into $1.25
trillion in open trading positions). For comprehensive information on LTCM's
background and near-collapse, see Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked;
N.Y. TnMs, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6, at 24; Carol J. Loomis, A House Built on Sand,
FoxRuNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110; Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan & Mitchell
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all, 1998 provided a great test for the internal model approach.
Third quarter events not only emphasized the uncertainty,
volatility, and complexity in financial markets today, but also
drove home the importance of evaluating counterparty credit risk
and stress testing.
As these events transpired, we were again reminded of the
need to emphasize fundamental principles of banking and risk
management, which include things like maintaining adequate
diversification, capital adequacy, internal controls, and containing
the level of credit risk. Whether the issues involve Russia,
LTCM, ING Barings, real estate lending, derivatives sales, or
whatever, we find ourselves returning to these concepts. We all
know them. The difficulty is putting everything into practice.
Indeed, the changes taking place in financial markets today
are also affecting our supervisory techniques. It becomes clearer
every day that we can no longer focus on validating balance
sheets during examinations, particularly at our largest banks, but
rather we must emphasize these principles of risk management.
Bank risk profiles can simply change too fast, and we need to
know that adequate policies and practices are continuously in
place. The same technology, management, and innovation that
accommodate a $28 trillion market in derivatives transactions for
United States banks alone must also be used to measure and
control the related risks. As the market grows, so must our
ability to manage it.
MARKET RISK MODELS
In terms of risk measurement, trading activities have
provided bank supervisors with an opportunity to review
innovative industry practices to strengthen the practices of many
banks, both here and abroad, and to make fundamental changes
to our regulatory approach. In deciding to rely on internal
models for market risk capital requirements, the supervisory
community pursued an entirely new technique in constructing a
capital standard. Let me expand on some of the factors that we
Pacele, All Bets are Off. How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at
Long-Term Capital; WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,1998, at Al.
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considered in developing that standard and how I view its
performance during the past year.
Internal models for bank trading of cash and derivative
instruments are based on a measure of "value-at-risk" ("VAR").4
That measure, in turn, indicates the maximum loss expected on a
portfolio during a particular period of time and a given
percentage-level of confidence. We chose this measure because
it was used by the banks in their daily management of trading
risks and because it was more accurate and far more risk sensitive
to changing market conditions than any identified alternative.
However, it was no panacea for determining the amount of
capital necessary for a trading business, and was rarely used for
that purpose by banks.
The principal weaknesses of VAR models were apparent to
all. By that I mean not so much the mathematical errors that a
complex model might contain, which can be its own concern, but
perhaps more importantly, the input to the models and the
assumptions the models reflect. The computer adage "G.I.G.O."
(i.e., garbage in, garbage out) always applies, and requires
institutions to have timely and accurate inputs about their
positions and historical market moves. In some markets,
particularly the emerging markets, historical data are unavailable
or irrelevant, making the measurement of past volatility difficult,
at best. Identifying the key assumptions in every model can be
harder still. Testing the sensitivity of those assumptions to the
modeling results is crucial, but it is a task not always undertaken.
Beyond the question of mathematics, inputs, and
assumptions are numerous decision points, such as what period to
use for measuring past market volatility and how to create an
appropriate level of rigor in a capital standard. The choices can
4. Value-at-risk [hereinafter VAR] is a type of sophisticated risk-
management model used by banks to estimate the amount of loss on a given
portfolio they are likely to incur over a given period of time. See The Risk
Business, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 21, 23 (discussing VAR modeling and
its vulnerabilities). See also Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 62
Fed. Reg. 68,064-65 (explaining how institutions use VAR calculations in
connection with regulatory capital standards); Jose A. Lopez, Methods for
Evaluating Value-at-Risk Estimates, EcoN. PoL'Y Rnv., Oct. 1997, at 119 (Fed.
Res. Bank of N.Y. 1998) (discussing the use of VAR estimates by banks under
the "internal models" approach of the Market Risk Amendment).
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have big effects. Future events need not repeat the past, at least
not as seen by the models; the experience of LTCM attests to
that. Loss frequency distributions are notoriously "fat-tailed,"
producing losses far larger and more frequent than most models
will predict. Measuring exposures on financial options is
particularly troublesome, and related modeling techniques
continue to evolve.
Taking these weaknesses into consideration, we built
regulatory capital requirements with an approximate ninety-nine
percent confidence level, a minimum one-year historical
observation period for evaluating market volatility, and an
assumed ten-day holding period to address the possible market
liquidity problems banks might encounter when closing certain
portfolio positions. Then we multiplied the resulting VAR
measure by three.
While the industry applauded the general direction we took,
it criticized many of the details, particularly the ten-day holding
period and the apparently arbitrary multiplier.5 Ten-day holding
periods were argued to be too long, because loss positions could
be closed within a few hours. Critics said the level of rigor we
imposed was much too harsh.
Similarly, it was claimed that the multiplier was
inappropriate and produced an excessive capital charge.
Regulators, to the contrary, viewed it as necessary, given market
uncertainties and the acknowledged limitations of VAR models
in dealing with rare events. Moreover, analysis of historical, daily
market moves going back nearly twenty years also supported the
need for a multiplier of that size in order to cover losses on
seemingly reasonable portfolios.
Another key consideration was that we could afford to make
mistakes in designing capital requirements for trading activities.
For most commercial banks, the level of market risk and the
related capital charge are relatively small. Whether we required
5. See e.g., Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, Bank Capital
Requirements for Market Risk: The Internal Models Approach, ECON. POL'Y
Rv., Dec. 1998, at 1, 6 (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. 1998) (noting that many
commentators have criticized the ten-day standard for introducing "a
discrepancy between the value-at-risk estimates validated in the backtest [of
VAR calculations] and the estimate actually used for capital purposes.").
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materially too little capital or too much, banks would still survive,
and they would also be able to compete. For example, the
market risk capital charge for most large U.S. banks is roughly
two to three percent of their total regulatory capital
requirements.
It is somewhat surprising, then, that within this first year I
read so much in the press and banking journals about how
models have "failed." Who is surprised? That they failed was to
be expected. At a ninety-nine percent confidence level, with
more than 200 trading days each year, mathematically we expect
the model to fail at least twice every year. The analysis of the
viability of these models must go further than that. In what way
did they fail, and what damage was done? And what should
supervisors and banks learn from the experience?
Did trading results in the stressful third quarter exceed
regulatory capital requirements? The answer is no. The standard
worked largely as expected. Only a handful of U.S. banks
reported a full quarterly trading loss, and in each case the
allocated capital was materially more than the reported loss.
Were daily losses larger than what the models predicted? Sure,
but that was to be expected. In 1998, we also found cases where
banks had more than the expected two or so exceptions, but it
was an exceptionally tough year. Some daily losses extended well
beyond the worst expectations. That may be what some critics of
models have in mind, but it is also the nature of "fat" distribution
tails, and why we have the multiplier.
Our supervisory approach is to evaluate the integrity of the
models in terms of the frequency of daily exceptions to the
measured maximum expected loss. We never gave VAR models
much credit for covering the size of an exceptional loss; that is the
role of the multiplier. Traders and management have every
incentive to take action, and not just sit on losing positions as
markets turn against them. Their responses and the presence of
internal controls provide comfort, too. The principal remaining
concern is whether, during a crisis period, markets will provide
sufficient depth and liquidity for institutions to reduce exposures
without causing too dramatic a change in market values.
Indeed, the Market Risk Amendment and our supervisory
approach require much more than "sufficiently accurate" VAR
CAPITAL STANDARDS REGULATION
models. In developing the standard, we placed much importance
on a variety of so-called "qualitative factors." These include the
need for separate risk management units in banks that calculate
exposures and that are organizationally independent of the
trading functions. They include a process of back-testing the
model's performance that goes beyond counting exceptions and
explores the underlying cause when a loss exceeds expectations.
These qualitative factors also include a process for stress
testing, in order to gain greater insight into the possible
magnitude of a loss if things do go materially wrong. Results of
these stress tests should be weighed heavily by management in
evaluating its trading positions and the amount of capital the
trading function needs. Such tests must be tailored to each
institution and to its specific trading strategy. They are not easily
standardized through regulations. Stress testing is critical to
sound practices, as recent events have shown. Banks here and
throughout the world need to devote greater attention to this
area.
Overall, in judging VAR models, we should be neither overly
harsh nor naive. They are important tools, but no more. In my
view as a bank supervisor, VAR models generally performed well
in a difficult first year, and appear to have served their intended
role. Banks simply need to continue to make them better.
THE MArER OF CREDrr RISK
With the development of the Market Risk Amendment
behind it, the Basle Committee is now turning its focus to the far
more important risk in lending. Since 1988, credit risk has been
measured crudely for regulatory purposes. Unfortunately, most
banks have also measured it crudely. The problem is that it is
hard to do. Despite the legitimate criticism directed at the
current Basle Capital Accord,6 there is no practical, broadly
accepted replacement to that standard readily at hand. Current
efforts in Basle to explore ways to finely tune risk buckets can
only lead to a partial, short-term fix.
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing criticism).
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As we began to evaluate the variety of emerging credit risk
models, we found clear reason to pause. Make no mistake; much
progress is being made, and such progress needs to continue. But
few supervisors anywhere in the world believe these models are
ready for "prime time."
One problem is that credit risk counts. Where we could
afford mistakes with market risk, here we cannot. Credit risk
drives a bank's capital needs, and, except for fraud, is almost
always the cause of bank failures. Even with trading activities,
much of the risk relates to the possibility that a counterparty will
default, a fact that many traders have been reminded of in recent
months.
Much of the difficulty in measuring credit risk relates to the
data problem (G.I.G.O.), long-term exposures, and the complex
mathematics involved. Credit losses happen relatively
infrequently compared to market risk, but typically cause more
damage when they occur. Unlike trading, there is rarely "upside"
potential. The best that can happen is that the loan will be
repaid. Evaluating the credit worthiness of a borrower or
counterparty is also more subjective than measuring the expected
profit on a derivatives contract. Factors like the industry outlook
and the management strength of the borrower play important
roles. The value of any collateral and other details of the loan
contract also affect the amount of loss if a customer defaults.
This matter of subjective judgment is key. No matter how
sophisticated a bank's model may be, the core input for the
model is the rating assigned to the borrower or loan facility. In
virtually all cases these ratings are based on judgments applied by
credit analysts or relationship officers, subject to an after-the-fact
loan review. There clearly is discipline in the process, but it is far
from rocket science.
The training provided to these individuals seems to be gained
as much through osmosis and exposure to the bank's credit
culture, as through formal policies and instruction. Moreover,
the rating process at many banks has focused in large part on
weak or problem loans for regulatory and internal reporting.
Fortunately for most banks, those loans are only a small part of
the total, which often leaves the vast bulk of the loan portfolio
distributed among only a few credit ratings.
1999] CAPITAL STANDARDS REGULATION 59
This lack of differentiation among performing credits
provides a poor basis on which to build a regulatory capital
framework. Credit rating agencies such as Moody's Investors
Service and Standard and Poor's employ four basic ratings for
investment grade products and subdivide those ratings further.
Adding non-investment grade ratings brings their number of total
categories to nearly twenty. Credit markets believe such fine
distinctions are relevant for judging a bond's underlying strength
and proper price. To use their credit risk models most
effectively, banks may eventually need to be similarly precise,
perhaps not as much for regulatory purposes as for themselves.
Obviously, credit ratings cover a wide range of probabilities
of default. "AAA" or "AA" rated credits, for example, virtually
never default, and would require little bank equity capital for
support. Risks increase exponentially, though, as the rating
declines. By simply moving from Moody's "Baal" rating to
"Bal," which is still investment grade, the expected one-year
default rate increases seven-fold, from 0.1 percent to 0.7 percent.
The speculative "B3" rating shows default rates greater than 13
percent, and lower-rated instruments have default rates much
higher than that.
Credit rating agencies can make such fine gradations because
they are paid specifically to provide the ratings (always on large
transactions), and because their livelihood rests on such accurate
and precise distinctions. Banks simply cannot afford to do that
for every one of the many thousands of commercial loans.
In addition, banks have generally not invested in retaining
historical data on default and loss performance for their
institutions by loan type and risk grade. Consequently, unlike
bond ratings, the losses, and thus implied capital requirements,
for each grade must be guessed at. Some institutions use hard
data, based on judgmentally driven "mappings" from their rating
scales to that of Moody's or Standard and Poor's. Others may
make use of bankruptcy prediction models or similar tools to
provide further insight. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, we do
not yet have the sort of well-established quantitative regularities
that made VAR possible for market risk.
What does that mean for understanding and measuring the
risk in a portfolio, and indeed the accuracy of a model's output, if
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credit ratings are broad and relatively imprecise, yet the expected
default frequency associated with individual ratings swings by
such large factors? This is a crucial question we must resolve if
we are to make meaningful progress in improving regulatory
capital standards for credit risk.
It is also an issue banks should no longer ignore for their own
risk management and business purposes. As markets become
ever more competitive and refined, banks will need to identify,
monitor, and measure their risks more precisely, too. That
information should be used throughout the bank in product
pricing, performance measurement, profitability analysis, and in
the determination of necessary capital and reserves.
What can we do in the meantime, given the growing
inadequacy of the current capital standard, at least as applied to
large banks? Although U.S. supervisors, in particular, are
looking hard for a way to move forward, the way forward is not
quite so clear. Before we can have confidence in a bank's
internal rating and risk measurement systems, we must see that
the bank has confidence in them too. Before regulators can use
these systems to build a capital standard, we must see banks
relying on them to guide their own practices in managing and
evaluating risks.
These systems need to address not only commercial lending,
which represents less than 20 percent of the industry's balance
sheet, but virtually all activities of the bank, both on and off
balance sheet. In many cases, banks need more gradations in
their internal ratings, and in general, they need to make greater
use of the information the ratings and risk models provide. Until
at least the large banks do this, how can we?
The Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation expects
to issue a supervisory policy statement to the Federal Reserve
Banks and the banking system discussing this need, and urging
banks to make greater progress in the areas I have described. I
hope that everyone takes that message to heart. I would also
highly recommend a recent article by Bill Treacy and Mark
Carey published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.7 It provides an
excellent discussion of the credit risk rating processes at large
7. William F. Treacy & Mark S. Carey, Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S.
Banks, in 84 FED. Rles. BULL. 897 (Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Bank 1998).
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U.S. banks. As I mentioned, that is where a review of the risk
modeling process should begin.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I would note that developing new capital
standards and implementing them through the regulatory process
takes time, particularly in an international context that involves
the European Union. Do not expect substantial change soon.
Nevertheless, under the leadership of President McDonough
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Basle Supervisors
Committee is undertaking a concerted effort to address the more
glaring problems of the Basle Capital Accord within a relatively
brief period. Some proposals for change are expected this year.
Long-term, more permanent solutions of the nature I
discussed will take more time. Much of the difficulty is that while
the theory for measuring credit risk may sound good, numerous
practical problems remain. As with market risk, U.S. banks must
show the way. However, with credit risk, our banks may have a
long way to go.
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